On May 14, 2020, in James G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. FTJ, Inc., the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a judgment on an unjust enrichment claim in favor of FTJ, a drywall supplier on a condominium project, against Davis, the general contractor. Notably, FTJ did not have a purchase order with Davis, but FTJ was able to rely on the existence of a joint check agreement and Davis’s multiple assurances regarding payment and the resulting inducement for FTJ to continue performance to succeed on its theory of unjust enrichment.
Davis subcontracted with a drywall company to complete the drywall and metal framing for the building. The subcontractor hired FTJ to supply the drywall materials for the project. According to the court, to ensure the smooth operation of the project, Davis, its subcontractor, and FTJ executed a joint check agreement for Davis to make any and all checks out to both the subcontractor and its supplier. When the subcontractor fell behind on invoices for drywall, FTJ repeatedly contacted Davis about these past due payments, and each time, Davis assured FTJ that a check had been written or would be written for the materials at issue. As a result, FTJ continued to ship materials that it would have typically withheld on a past due account. During these interactions, Davis learned that its subcontractor was having trouble meeting payment obligations and worried that it would be unable to pay FTJ for materials.
When the subcontractor defaulted, Davis requested that FTJ not ship further materials and, again, assured FTJ that there were funds available to pay FTJ on past due amounts. FTJ did not file a lien, in part, because of its confidence that Davis would satisfy its subcontractor’s debts. However, after terminating the subcontractor, Davis incurred additional costs to complete the subcontractor’s work and informed FTJ that Davis could only pay a fraction of the past due invoices. FTJ filed suit, and, after finding the joint check agreement void for lack of consideration, the trial court ruled in FTJ’s favor on its claim for unjust enrichment.
On appeal, Davis argued the trial court decision should be overturned based on the following:
- The joint check agreement was valid, and the existence of a contract covering the subject matter of a dispute precluded recovery for unjust enrichment.
- The unjust enrichment claim should be barred because it forced Davis to pay for the same goods twice, first, under the subcontract and, again, under the court’s judgment.
- Because the joint check agreement required Davis to make payments only when Davis actually owed money to the subcontractor, and no such payments were actually owed, FTJ failed to satisfy one of the key elements of an unjust enrichment claim — that a defendant must reasonably have expected to repay the plaintiff for the benefit conferred.
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments finding:
- The existence of the joint check agreement, even if valid, did not foreclose recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment, where the benefit conferred was outside the scope of that agreement. The court concluded the joint check agreement governed the parties’ interactions only as to the form of payment, and, thus, FTJ’s claim regarding nonpayment of delivered materials fell outside the plain terms of the joint check agreement. The court also reasoned that Davis’ repeated assurances that it would pay FTJ for materials after the subcontractor fell behind on payment created separate expectations regarding payment outside the confines of the joint check agreement.
- Davis was not being asked to pay twice for the same goods because the dispute with FTJ involved payment for specific supplies and not the overall cost of the project. The evidence established that Davis did not pay for the delivered materials, Davis used the materials, and, absent those materials, Davis would have had to procure replacement supplies elsewhere, so, the court reasoned, Davis was only being required to pay once for those materials.
- The language in the joint check agreement limiting Davis’s obligation to payment for amounts actually owed to the subcontractor was undone by Davis’s course of conduct in repeatedly assuring FTJ of payment to induce further delivery of materials. Based on that course of conduct, the trial court could plausibly conclude that Davis expected to pay for the drywall delivered by FTJ.
In upholding the trial court’s decision, the Virginia Supreme Court emphasized the narrowness of its holding as to the specific facts at issue. The court appeared particularly troubled by Davis’s intrusion into the subcontract-supplier relationship by providing repeated promises of payment to encourage FTJ’s continued performance. The opinion also includes a lengthy dissent criticizing a number of legal positions staked out by the majority.
What lessons can be learned from this decision?
Under these circumstances, any broad takeaways or lessons from the court’s ruling are limited. The decision creates as many questions as it answers. For example, progress billings often do not itemize expenditures from individual suppliers, but the court’s decision suggests a contractor will not be able to rely on progress payments to demonstrate payment of suppliers whose work should have been incorporated into the work during the applicable pay period. How, then, can a contractor be expected to avoid double payment for work when sub-subcontractor raises a claim for unjust enrichment?
Regardless, contractors should be mindful of the court’s approach in Davis. Strong legal arguments will not always be enough to overcome certain factual scenarios, and the reverse may also be true. The dispute in Davis was only over $160,000, and after extensive and expensive litigation, the court found the contractor responsible for the full amount. To avoid unfortunate and unpredictable results like the decision in Davis, it is important to spend time evaluating claims on the front end and exploring reasonable commercial resolutions to any dispute.
If you have any questions about the decision in Davis, please feel free to contact Aman Kahlon.